Baseline probability that individual i is willing to settle for his/her partner j, contingent on how much the share of the household income that j would contribute deviates from .5 (sj ? .5) at different levels of ?
Even though our artificial individuals are aversive of accepting somebody who makes less than they do as partner, this aversion decreases when they fail to find a better alternative who is also willing to accept them as a partner. We implement this by weighting \(P_\) by the number of time steps that the focal individual i has been looking for a better alternative without success at the beginning of time step t (ci,t):
Until then happens, j could possibly get still see contrary-sex participants, hence often leads j to break with i, if j knowledge a person who brings in over we which can be as well as ready to day j
Equation (2) holds that individual i becomes increasingly willing to settle for their current partner, the longer he/she has been searching for an alternative already (i.e., the larger ci,t becomes). Thus, individuals are striving for high-income partners and try to attain their goal by ‘trading up’ their current dates whenever they get the opportunity to do so. Yet, if they fail to find somebody better for some time, they become increasingly likely to settle for their current partner. This is particularly likely for those whose partners earn at least as much as they do.